Beyond shadows
This is not to say that the plan is perfect, a full-grown Athena sprung from the head of the opposition’s Zeus.The original explanation, issued by Deputy Minority Leader Roilo Golez, is drawn with broad strokes: “The shadow Cabinet will perform oversight activities as well as serve as critical but constructive partners [sic] in the crafting of priority measures.”
The devil, we know, is in the details. Golez declined to name who among the opposition congressmen would “shadow” which Cabinet secretary; the only other detail he offered was a list of the high-priority departments the opposition would monitor. A close look at his list, however, shows that almost every line department is included.
As we said, it isn’t perfect. The way the plan was presented is also problematic, because it stressed that aspect of opposition politics that we know, in the Philippines, by the quaint Filipino English word “fiscalize.”
An administration congressman’s quick retort to the idea proves that the plan was, in fact, received as a “fiscalizing” initiative. “There’s nothing new with the opposition’s move to form a shadow Cabinet that will perform oversight activities and that will be critical of Cabinet members. That’s what opposition members have been doing over the years during the President’s term,” said Rep. Mauricio Domogan of Baguio City. (In other terms, under other Presidents, too.)
Another political player, this time a long-time advocate of constitutional change, belittled the plan as a pale and inadequate reflection of the parliamentary system of government.
But politics, eminently, is the art of the possible. While the use of the resonant phrase is only figurative, “shadow Cabinet” as a political strategy can lead to certain outcomes; it can, as the expression goes, make things happen.
For that reason, it should be welcomed.
Setting up a “shadow Cabinet” will not only allow the opposition to hold the administration to greater account; it will also allow the opposition to place itself under greater accountability. How? It will force opposition congressmen to do their homework. It will force opposition congressmen to choose an area of specialization. (After all, generic criticism is easy; informed, expert criticism is difficult but more useful.) Not least, it will force opposition congressmen to raise the standards of policy debate and public discourse. (Whether politicians allied with the Arroyo administration will follow this lead is another matter altogether, and may be decided, in large part, at the polls in 2010.)
The principal assumption behind the “shadow Cabinet” idea, in other words, is aglow with possibility: It will help us grow in political maturity.
Consider: Instead of the minority leader (Rep. Ronaldo Zamora of San Juan) or his spokesman doing all the talking, other oppositionists will step up to the microphone. A health care crisis may require the expertise of a doctor in the House; an inquiry into the Arroyo administration’s counter-terrorism strategy may require the competence of a national-security expert.
(As politicians will be quick to realize, this setup runs counter to the personalistic nature of our politics; no one leader, no one spokesman, will hog the spotlight. This is bad for those with ambitions for higher office, but—if managed well—a boon for governance.)
To be sure, the character of Philippine politics is deeply flawed; many of its defects can end the “shadow Cabinet” experiment prematurely.
Our political parties remain weak; with one or two exceptions, they remain what they have always been since the first legislature was inaugurated a hundred years ago: political factions, centered around a political personality of fabulous wealth. The reality of political participation continues to reward sheer opportunity over obstinate principle. And the line between the administration or the opposition, despite the turmoil of the past few years, remains a blur.
But as the Greek poet Pindar said: Exhaust the limits of the possible. The “shadow Cabinet” idea seems like a good next step. Take it.
