Reckless warmongering

Yet again, we face a vital test of institutions. The beheading of Philippine Marines in Tipo-Tipo continues to foster a justified outrage, and keeps on producing shocking, even damning, allegations of incompetence on the part of the armed forces. First, there were questions concerning the ammunition provided the troops. Then, more recently, there emerged the equally shocking allegation that the Marines were unable to receive assistance, for lack of a common radio frequency between the men on the ground and the pilots sent to lend them air support.

The Marines want revenge. By all accounts, the public is largely foursquare behind the soldiers. We recall an observation made by a TV executive, some months ago. With regard to news and current affairs, the public hates news of the fighting in Mindanao: ratings show that when shows cover that topic, viewers switch channels. The public would much rather keep the fighting in Mindanao out of sight—and out of mind.

But nothing gets public opinion heated up than the massacre of soldiers, and nothing brings out a residual patriotism in the public than a military offensive in Mindanao. And it is very easy for the national leadership to pander to—there’s no other word for it—such chauvinism by letting loose the dogs of war.

This is why we say the country faces a vital test of institutions. The Marines, sent to rescue a hostaged Italian priest, apparently stumbled onto territory jealously guarded by rebels, who engaged the Marines in a firefight and butchered them when the soldiers were subdued—because their ammunition was defective, their command-and-control ineffectual, and their search-and-rescue proved a suicide charge.

The question is whether a military offensive should proceed on the basis of a bungled operation. Perhaps the public doesn’t care why the soldiers died, and only, that they did—and that the rebels must pay. However, the public ought to care that the soldiers, who died bravely, also died senselessly: and that more soldiers’ lives will be squandered if the military doesn’t get a grip on the causes of the massacre in the first place.

The causes are two. First, the rebels in Mindanao are either disunited (with factions talking peace while others are trying to goad the military into renewed hostilities), or plain insincere about the peace talks, valuing the protection of their territorial enclaves more than the peace process. Second, the armed forces, because of poor generalship, and inefficiency verging on the criminal, are incapable of mounting effective operations, which include supporting troops tasked with missions on the ground. All this, despite the active assistance of allies in the fight against groups like the Abu Sayyaf, once a bandit group but which has now armed itself with a pan-Islamic, radical ideology.

The same intellectual ferment that produced the First Quarter Storm also gave birth to the concept of a Bangsamoro. President Ferdinand Marcos’ delusions of being the conqueror of Sabah resulted in the Jabidah massacre, revolt in Muslim Mindanao and the bloodiest fighting in the country since World War II. The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 established a brittle peace with the Moro National Liberation Front.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front split off as a more radical offshoot, with dreams of a Bangsamoro more patently religious than the fairly secular MNLF. But the MILF has been torn by a further radicalization: dreams of an Islamic state covering the region. The MILF has flirted with the Jemaah Islamiyah, which has a larger goal, represented by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda: to restore an Islamic caliphate. The Abu Sayyaf belongs to this radical, pan-Islamic regional movement.

Human Rights Watch recently reported that since 2000, more than 1,700 civilians have been killed or wounded in terror attacks, mainly in Mindanao. This is more than the casualties in terror-related activities in Indonesia, or Morocco, Spain, Turkey, or Britain. And yet, our institutions have overlooked a central question: unquestionably popular a military solution might be, among Christians (particularly in Mindanao), the Filipino Muslim voice—particularly those clamoring for peace—has been not only largely drowned out, but also ignored. Yet, who can doubt that a lasting victory against terrorism, and a just peace, are impossible without their support?